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as a right so that he will acknowledge
mine in turn. Non-human animals can
neither assert self-interested claims
as rights nor force human beings to
acknowledge them through the coercive
power to infringe on their correspond
ing rights. Hence non-human animals
have no rights. We are therefore
morally entitled to abuse them in any
way we choose, so long as we do not
violate our own self-interest.

..
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In his article "Animal Rights"
(CJP 7 [1977], pp. 161-178), Jan
Narveson presents an alternative
moral theory to what he calls the
"Singer-Regan position." This theory 
rational egoism - would exclude
non-human animals from moral considera
tion and deny them all rights. Regan
replied to this argument in his
article "Narveson on Egoism and the
Rights of Animals" (CJP 7 [1977], pp.
179-186). Now Dale Jamieson has
entered the debate with his "Rational
Egoism and Animal Rights," a critique
both of Narveson's position and of
Regan's rebuttal.
Narveson's argument, briefly, is
as follows: rights are based solely
on agreements between rational egoists
which foster the mutual attainment of
self-interested ends. I acknowledge
someone else's self-interested claim

Jamieson points out that this
theory also denies rights to mental
defectives and to young children.
How does Narveson ensure that these
"rightless" humans will not be abused?
He argues that the very self-interest
which is the basis of rights dictates
that we treat these humans as though
they had rights. A rational egoist
will treat children equally because
the self-interests of parents includes
the self-interest of their children
and because he has nothing to gain
from abusing other people's children.
He will treat morons equally lest he
not be treated equally were he to
become a moron. To this "rational"
argument Narveson appends two
"non-rational" bases for equal
treatment of morons. The first is
that a moron's rational relatives may
have a "sentimental interest" in his
being treated equally. The other
factor is "sentiment-generalization,"
the human tendency to extend sympathy
to members of one's own race, species,
etc.
In their replies to Narveson,
both Regan and Jamieson try to show
that considerations of self-interest
will not guarantee that morons and
children will be treated equally.
Regan limits himself to the case of
idiots, arguing that it is unnecessary,
from the perspective of rational
egoism, to accord equal treatment to
all idiots in order to guarantee
protection for oneself in the event
that one became an idiot. All that
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would be necessary would be to guaran
tee continued equal treatment of all
those who became idiots. This leaves
the door open for the abuse of congen
ital idiots since such abuse would in
no way violate the rational egoists'
self-interests. Nor would "sentimental
interest" guarantee equal treatment of
congenital idiots since many of them
are not the object of such interest.

to the extent that Narveson is incon
sistent in his reasoning, i.e., is
not a pure rational egoist. A con
sistent rational egoist has no
reason to share Jamieson's concern
for "marginal cases. i, Mistreatment
of children and morons can be of no
moral concern to a consistent rational
egoist unless it results in the
reduction of his own self-interest.

Jamieson criticizes Regan's
second point on the grounds that a
rational egoist could respond that the
"epistemological problem" involved in
determining who is the object of
sentimental interest is so severe that
all idiots should be included in the
"ambit of morality." This seems to me
a rather quibbling, if not patently
false objection to Regan's argument.

Insofar as Narveson is inconsist
ently concerned about children and
idiots, this is an indication of his
implicit acceptance of a moral
premise which runs against the doctrine
of rational egoism. This is the
chief flaw in his argument which
should be examined, but Jamieson
totally ignores it.

Nor are Jamieson's own arguments
any stronger. He asserts that the
concept of egoistic self-interest is
fluid and that we consequently might
come to the view that idiots are
"obscene moral failures" who should
be exterminated. Such an alteration
in rational egoists' concepts of their
own self-interest would result in
the abuse of idiots being mandated
by self-interest.
Jamieson also hypothesizes that
a population explosion could result
in a view of human fetuses as a
threat to survival and as therefore
contrary to one's self-interests.
Were this to happen we might resort
to cannibalism. Anything, of course,
is possible, but these "fables," as
Jamieson calls them, bear more
resemblance to the idle and rather
paranoid speculations which support
domino theories in politics than to
a cogent retort to rational egoism.
Jamieson's argument, however,
suffers from more serious defects
than implausibility. In the first
place, it is not even relevant except

Moreover, his approach is
defective in principle, for it leaves
open the possibility of justifying
the continued abuse of non-human
animals. By accepting the issue on
Narveson's own terms, Jamieson grants
him the opportunity to try to produce
more convincing arguments from self
interest for the equal treatment of
children and idiots. Were he success
ful in doing this, then the continued
abuse of animals would be justified
on the principles of rational egoism.
Jamieson's argument is thus
incorrigibly speciesist: he argues,
in effect, that it is wrong to abuse
animals because it may lead to the
abuse of human beings. Thus when he
concludes his article by saying that
"because it is a bad moral theory,
rational egoism fails to provide a
solid basis for a principled indiffer
ence to the suffering of animals," he
is certainly correct, but not at all
in the way he imagines. Rational
egoism is a "bad moral theory," not
because the equal treatment of
children and idiots cannot be
guaranteed by considerations of
egoistic self-interest, but because
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the exclusion of non-human animals
(as well as children and idiots) from
ethical consideration is a moral out
outrage which is totally unjustified if
one accepts what I take to be a self
selfevident moral principle: viz. that
pain is an evil, the deliberate,
unnecessary infliction of which is
always morally wrong.
George P. Cave
Trans-Species Unlimited
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